Here are some of the cases which Mr. Sowerby has handled on appeal and which resulted in an opinion published by the appellate court. The list includes both successful and unsuccessful appeals. No effort has been made to include cases before 1996. Cases not resulting in a published opinion are excluded. (Some appellate decisions are not published. Only cases with published opinions become the law of the land.) The vast majority of cases are not appealed. |
McKelvey v. Georgia Judicial Retirement System, 297 Ga. App. 650 (2009), cert. den.
___ GA. ____. A lawyer used his private law practice office to run the Solicitor's
Office of Sumter County for 17 years. The county paid him a salary to be the solicitor
and reimbursed his administrative expenses separately. The county reported his
salary and not the reimbursement for administrative expenses to the Georgia Judicial
Retirement System, which calculated his retirement benefits accordingly. Because of
the definitions contained in the statutes providing for judicial retirement benefits, he
sought to have his retirement calculated on both his salary and the administrative
expenses. We lost.
Riddle v. Golden Isles Broadcasting, LLC, 292 Ga. App. 888 (2008). The jury
awarded Mr. Riddle $100,000 compensation for a slanderous broadcast. The trial
judge thought that was too much money, even though he admitted that he had never
seen a slander case go to trial in his 50 years on the bench. He ruled that Mr. Riddle
could either accept $60,000 or he would grant a new trial as to damages only. We
opted for the new trial, and the second jury awarded $25,000. We appealed,
contending that the grant of the new trial was contrary to the preponderance of the
evidence and was therefore an abuse of discretion. We also contended that the trial
court made a series of other errors during the second trial. The Court of Appeals
agreed that the trial judge abused his discretion and reinstated the first jury's verdict.
Prescott v. Colonial Properties Trust, 283 Ga. App. 753 (2007). Ms. Prescott slipped
on an invisible puddle of liquid at the mall. The trial court granted summary judgment
against her, because she had no evidence that the mall knew the liquid was on the
floor and no evidence of how long it had been there. I was hired to appeal that
decision. On appeal, summary judgment was reversed on the theory that since the
mall failed to present evidence of its inspection procedures, the plaintiff was entitled
to an inference that the mall had constructive knowledge of the spill.
Howell v. Shumans, 281 Ga. App. 459 (2006). Mrs. Howell sued Dr. Shumans
alleging that his staff disclosed her confidential health information without
authorization. The trial court accepted defendant's argument that it was a medical
malpractice action and dismissed the case, because the Complaint did not have
attached to it an affidavit from a doctor pointing out at least one negligent act or
omission by the defendant doctor. Thanks to 1980's "tort reform", an action alleging
professional negligence must have an affidavit from an expert witness attached to the
complaint or it is subject to dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed, properly noting
that the complaint never alleged any negligence, so there was no need for an
affidavit. The complaint alleged a cause of action for invasion of privacy, not medical
malpractice.
Riddle v. Golden Isles Broadcasting, LLC, 275 Ga. App. 701 (2005). In 2003, rapper
Slim Riddle sued a local radio station, alleging that it slandered him when it broadcast
that he had killed his baby's mama. The Superior Court granted summary judgment
against him on the ground that he was a public figure and had to prove actual malice
to get around the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that he was not a
public figure. The case was tried to one jury which rendered a verdict for $100,000,
but the judge threw that out, so it was tried to another jury which rendered a verdict
for $25,000. Another appeal is pending. See above.
Hollis v. Hollis, 278 Ga. 303 (2004). Mr. & Mrs. Hollis divorced and later disagreed
whether a tract of land was his or hers. The court held that the language of the
Separation Agreement sufficiently identified the tract and at issue and the parties
intended for that tract to be his.
Davis v. Crum, 263 Ga. App. 682 (2003). Mr. Davis was physically assaulted and
severely beaten by a gang in the trailer park where he lived in the wee hours of the
morning. The Court of Appeals held that he should have walked away as soon as he
saw his friend getting pummeled by the gang instead of walking up to it and drawing a
knife to defend himself when the gang turned on him. The court found that, as a
matter of law, he was more to blame for his own injuries than the owner of the trailer
park who was aware of the gang activity and did nothing to stop it, therefore the case
should not be submitted to a jury to decide who was more at fault.
Chung-A-On v. Drury, 276 Ga. 558 (2003). Ms. Drury sued her ex-husband to
change custody. She sued him in the Georgia court where they had been divorced.
He had long since moved to Florida. The trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court
found no merit to his assertion that the due process clause of federal constitution
prevented the Georgia court from exercising jurisdiction over his person.
Corson v. Marble, 257 Ga. App. 874 (2002). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court for failing to enter written findings of fact when it denied a custodial father's
petition to obtain child support from the child's mother.
GHG, Inc.. v. Bryan, 275 Ga. 336 (2002). GHG, Inc. opposed an action to quiet title
and hired me after the special master ruled against it. The appellate court ruled that
the issues GHG tried to raise were raised too late.
Southern General Insurance Company v. Crews, 253 Ga. App. 765 (2002). Southern
General tried to limit it's liability by filing a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that
it could only be liable on one insurance policy it had issued. It had issued a policy to
the mother insuring her car. It had issued another policy to the daughter insuring
another car. The mother and the daughter were killed in a collision, although the
daughter's infant baby survived. There was conflicting evidence whether the mother
or the daughter had been driving. The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that
it could potentially be liable on both policies.
U.S. v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). I was appointed to represent a
convicted felon charged with possessing a gun and three bullets. We moved to
suppress the gun and the bullets for lack of probable cause. At trial, the court tossed
the gun out, but let the bullets into evidence. The testimony of a firearms expert from
the A.T.F. saying that the bullets were manufactured in Illinois was challenged as
hearsay since he was merely repeating what someone else told him and what he read
in a catalogue. The Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of the bullets and the
expert's testimony.
Dikeman v. Mary A. Stearns, Inc., 253 Ga. App. 646 (2001). Mrs. Dikeman fired her
Atlanta divorce lawyer, because she was very dissatisfied with the services rendered.
The Atlanta lawyer sued for unpaid fees. Dikeman counter-claimed under RICO
alleging that the law firm had falsely inflated her bill, had done so for at least two
other clients and had mailed the bills through the U.S. Postal Service. The lawyer
refused to turn over discovery materials necessary to prove that the lawyer falsely
inflated her bills to other clients. The trial court and the appellate court approved the
lawyer's refusal.
Miller v. Kitchens, 251 Ga. App. 225 (2001). The plaintiff alleged that the doctor had
committed multiple acts of negligence before and during his surgery in October of
1997. The patient did not regain consciousness after the surgery until December.
He filed his lawsuit in December of 1999. The statute of limitations is two years, so the
issue was whether the statute began to run in October or December of 1997. The
court ruled that it started in October, when the negligent act or omission occurred,
and not in December, when the patient regained consciousness and became aware
of the of the pain caused by the alleged negligent act or omission, reasoning that the
latter date applies only in misdiagnosis cases.
Chaney v. Blackstone, 249 Ga. App. 194 (2001). This was a legal malpractice case
in which Mr. Chaney had been involved in a collision and suffered severe injuries. He
hired a tax lawyer to represent him. The tax lawyer filed a complaint in which he failed
to name as a defendant an unknown motorist whose negligence had, at least in part,
caused the collision. Come tax time, the tax lawyer dumped him and sent him to a
trial lawyer. That trial lawyer never did anything to try to bring the unknown motorist
into the trial. At trial against the driver of the car which hit Mr. Chaney head on, the
jury decided that the unknown motorist's negligence was the cause of the collision.
Mr. Chaney had $100,000 of uninsured motorist coverage which would have paid if
the tax and trial lawyers had named the unknown motorist as a defendant. Mr.
Chaney hired Mr. Sowerby to sue the lawyers. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the lawyers and kicked Mr. Chaney out of court. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that there was an issue of fact for a jury to resolve.
Power v. Georgia Exterminators, 243 Ga. App. 355 (2000). A buyer bought a house
which turned out to be infested with termites. She sued the realtor and the seller for
fraud and the termite inspector for negligence. On appeal, summary judgment in
favor of the realtor and the seller was affirmed. Summary judgment in favor of the
termite inspector was reversed.
Harrison v. Jenkins, 235 Ga. 665 (1999). The car in front of Mrs. Harrison stopped
unexpectedly. Mrs. Harrison stopped without hitting it, but the car behind her didn't
and rear-ended her. The driver of the car behind her settled out of court. At trial, the
trial court directed a verdict in favor of the driver in front of her, based upon a view of
the law which Mr. Sowerby argued was erroneous and outdated. A unanimous, full
court agreed with Mr. Sowerby and reversed the trial court.
Smith v. Stanley, 223 Ga. App. 334 (1996). A buyer of a house sued the seller and
the realtor alleging that they fraudulently concealed a problem with flooding. Trial
court denied the seller's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals
reversed, saying that the buyer failed to exercise due diligence in the inspection of
the property. Mr. Sowerby represented the seller.
___ GA. ____. A lawyer used his private law practice office to run the Solicitor's
Office of Sumter County for 17 years. The county paid him a salary to be the solicitor
and reimbursed his administrative expenses separately. The county reported his
salary and not the reimbursement for administrative expenses to the Georgia Judicial
Retirement System, which calculated his retirement benefits accordingly. Because of
the definitions contained in the statutes providing for judicial retirement benefits, he
sought to have his retirement calculated on both his salary and the administrative
expenses. We lost.
Riddle v. Golden Isles Broadcasting, LLC, 292 Ga. App. 888 (2008). The jury
awarded Mr. Riddle $100,000 compensation for a slanderous broadcast. The trial
judge thought that was too much money, even though he admitted that he had never
seen a slander case go to trial in his 50 years on the bench. He ruled that Mr. Riddle
could either accept $60,000 or he would grant a new trial as to damages only. We
opted for the new trial, and the second jury awarded $25,000. We appealed,
contending that the grant of the new trial was contrary to the preponderance of the
evidence and was therefore an abuse of discretion. We also contended that the trial
court made a series of other errors during the second trial. The Court of Appeals
agreed that the trial judge abused his discretion and reinstated the first jury's verdict.
Prescott v. Colonial Properties Trust, 283 Ga. App. 753 (2007). Ms. Prescott slipped
on an invisible puddle of liquid at the mall. The trial court granted summary judgment
against her, because she had no evidence that the mall knew the liquid was on the
floor and no evidence of how long it had been there. I was hired to appeal that
decision. On appeal, summary judgment was reversed on the theory that since the
mall failed to present evidence of its inspection procedures, the plaintiff was entitled
to an inference that the mall had constructive knowledge of the spill.
Howell v. Shumans, 281 Ga. App. 459 (2006). Mrs. Howell sued Dr. Shumans
alleging that his staff disclosed her confidential health information without
authorization. The trial court accepted defendant's argument that it was a medical
malpractice action and dismissed the case, because the Complaint did not have
attached to it an affidavit from a doctor pointing out at least one negligent act or
omission by the defendant doctor. Thanks to 1980's "tort reform", an action alleging
professional negligence must have an affidavit from an expert witness attached to the
complaint or it is subject to dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed, properly noting
that the complaint never alleged any negligence, so there was no need for an
affidavit. The complaint alleged a cause of action for invasion of privacy, not medical
malpractice.
Riddle v. Golden Isles Broadcasting, LLC, 275 Ga. App. 701 (2005). In 2003, rapper
Slim Riddle sued a local radio station, alleging that it slandered him when it broadcast
that he had killed his baby's mama. The Superior Court granted summary judgment
against him on the ground that he was a public figure and had to prove actual malice
to get around the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that he was not a
public figure. The case was tried to one jury which rendered a verdict for $100,000,
but the judge threw that out, so it was tried to another jury which rendered a verdict
for $25,000. Another appeal is pending. See above.
Hollis v. Hollis, 278 Ga. 303 (2004). Mr. & Mrs. Hollis divorced and later disagreed
whether a tract of land was his or hers. The court held that the language of the
Separation Agreement sufficiently identified the tract and at issue and the parties
intended for that tract to be his.
Davis v. Crum, 263 Ga. App. 682 (2003). Mr. Davis was physically assaulted and
severely beaten by a gang in the trailer park where he lived in the wee hours of the
morning. The Court of Appeals held that he should have walked away as soon as he
saw his friend getting pummeled by the gang instead of walking up to it and drawing a
knife to defend himself when the gang turned on him. The court found that, as a
matter of law, he was more to blame for his own injuries than the owner of the trailer
park who was aware of the gang activity and did nothing to stop it, therefore the case
should not be submitted to a jury to decide who was more at fault.
Chung-A-On v. Drury, 276 Ga. 558 (2003). Ms. Drury sued her ex-husband to
change custody. She sued him in the Georgia court where they had been divorced.
He had long since moved to Florida. The trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court
found no merit to his assertion that the due process clause of federal constitution
prevented the Georgia court from exercising jurisdiction over his person.
Corson v. Marble, 257 Ga. App. 874 (2002). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court for failing to enter written findings of fact when it denied a custodial father's
petition to obtain child support from the child's mother.
GHG, Inc.. v. Bryan, 275 Ga. 336 (2002). GHG, Inc. opposed an action to quiet title
and hired me after the special master ruled against it. The appellate court ruled that
the issues GHG tried to raise were raised too late.
Southern General Insurance Company v. Crews, 253 Ga. App. 765 (2002). Southern
General tried to limit it's liability by filing a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that
it could only be liable on one insurance policy it had issued. It had issued a policy to
the mother insuring her car. It had issued another policy to the daughter insuring
another car. The mother and the daughter were killed in a collision, although the
daughter's infant baby survived. There was conflicting evidence whether the mother
or the daughter had been driving. The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that
it could potentially be liable on both policies.
U.S. v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). I was appointed to represent a
convicted felon charged with possessing a gun and three bullets. We moved to
suppress the gun and the bullets for lack of probable cause. At trial, the court tossed
the gun out, but let the bullets into evidence. The testimony of a firearms expert from
the A.T.F. saying that the bullets were manufactured in Illinois was challenged as
hearsay since he was merely repeating what someone else told him and what he read
in a catalogue. The Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of the bullets and the
expert's testimony.
Dikeman v. Mary A. Stearns, Inc., 253 Ga. App. 646 (2001). Mrs. Dikeman fired her
Atlanta divorce lawyer, because she was very dissatisfied with the services rendered.
The Atlanta lawyer sued for unpaid fees. Dikeman counter-claimed under RICO
alleging that the law firm had falsely inflated her bill, had done so for at least two
other clients and had mailed the bills through the U.S. Postal Service. The lawyer
refused to turn over discovery materials necessary to prove that the lawyer falsely
inflated her bills to other clients. The trial court and the appellate court approved the
lawyer's refusal.
Miller v. Kitchens, 251 Ga. App. 225 (2001). The plaintiff alleged that the doctor had
committed multiple acts of negligence before and during his surgery in October of
1997. The patient did not regain consciousness after the surgery until December.
He filed his lawsuit in December of 1999. The statute of limitations is two years, so the
issue was whether the statute began to run in October or December of 1997. The
court ruled that it started in October, when the negligent act or omission occurred,
and not in December, when the patient regained consciousness and became aware
of the of the pain caused by the alleged negligent act or omission, reasoning that the
latter date applies only in misdiagnosis cases.
Chaney v. Blackstone, 249 Ga. App. 194 (2001). This was a legal malpractice case
in which Mr. Chaney had been involved in a collision and suffered severe injuries. He
hired a tax lawyer to represent him. The tax lawyer filed a complaint in which he failed
to name as a defendant an unknown motorist whose negligence had, at least in part,
caused the collision. Come tax time, the tax lawyer dumped him and sent him to a
trial lawyer. That trial lawyer never did anything to try to bring the unknown motorist
into the trial. At trial against the driver of the car which hit Mr. Chaney head on, the
jury decided that the unknown motorist's negligence was the cause of the collision.
Mr. Chaney had $100,000 of uninsured motorist coverage which would have paid if
the tax and trial lawyers had named the unknown motorist as a defendant. Mr.
Chaney hired Mr. Sowerby to sue the lawyers. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the lawyers and kicked Mr. Chaney out of court. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that there was an issue of fact for a jury to resolve.
Power v. Georgia Exterminators, 243 Ga. App. 355 (2000). A buyer bought a house
which turned out to be infested with termites. She sued the realtor and the seller for
fraud and the termite inspector for negligence. On appeal, summary judgment in
favor of the realtor and the seller was affirmed. Summary judgment in favor of the
termite inspector was reversed.
Harrison v. Jenkins, 235 Ga. 665 (1999). The car in front of Mrs. Harrison stopped
unexpectedly. Mrs. Harrison stopped without hitting it, but the car behind her didn't
and rear-ended her. The driver of the car behind her settled out of court. At trial, the
trial court directed a verdict in favor of the driver in front of her, based upon a view of
the law which Mr. Sowerby argued was erroneous and outdated. A unanimous, full
court agreed with Mr. Sowerby and reversed the trial court.
Smith v. Stanley, 223 Ga. App. 334 (1996). A buyer of a house sued the seller and
the realtor alleging that they fraudulently concealed a problem with flooding. Trial
court denied the seller's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals
reversed, saying that the buyer failed to exercise due diligence in the inspection of
the property. Mr. Sowerby represented the seller.
Law Office of Vincent D. Sowerby, P.C.
On the corner of G and Newcastle Streets, downtown Brunswick, Georgia
Telephone: 912-280-0330 Fax: 912-280-0331
E-mail address: vince@sowerbylaw.com
On the corner of G and Newcastle Streets, downtown Brunswick, Georgia
Telephone: 912-280-0330 Fax: 912-280-0331
E-mail address: vince@sowerbylaw.com
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